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SECURITY DEVICES
Thomas A. Harrell*
SURETYSHIP
The extent to which the Deficiency Judgment Act' applies to a surety
has given the courts difficulty throughout the years. The matter was again
considered by two of the circuits with somewhat conflicting results. In Ford
Motor Credit Company v. Soileau,2 defendant executed a note as co-maker
for the accommodation of his son who had borrowed money from plaintiff to
purchase an automobile. The son also secured the note with a chattel
mortgage upon the vehicle. Upon default, the plaintiff had the automobile
sold by executory process with benefit of appraisal and then sued defendant
for the deficiency. Defendant argued that he had been released from liability
because he had not been made a party to the executory proceedings, and that
therefore as to him the sale had in substance been made without appraisal.
The lower court agreed with defendant and dismissed the suit, but the Third
Circuit reversed, holding that the Deficiency Judgment Act was designed to
protect only the mortgage debtor who owned an interest in the property
which was sold. The court noted that there is no procedure by which a
person who is not the owner of the property can be made a party to executory
proceedings. The opinion appears to be correct. In theory executory process
is the execution of a judgment which has been confessed by the debtor, the
effect of which is limited to property upon which he has given a mortgage or
other security. Thus, no one is before the court except the judgment debtor.
The surety can no more be made a "party" to such proceedings than he
could if the creditor had secured a judgment against the debtor and was
executing upon his property by writ of fieri facias.
In Murdock Acceptance Corporation v. S.&H. Distributing Com-
pany,3 an Arkansas corporation sold three hundred vending machines to a
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
I. "If a mortgagee . . . takes advantage of a waiver of appraisement of his
property . . . by a debtor, and the proceeds of the judicial sale thereof are insuffi-
cient to satisfy the debt for which the property was sold, the debt nevertheless shall
stand fully satisfied . . . . The mortgagee . . . shall not have a right thereafter to
proceed against the debtor .... "LA. R.S. 13:4106 (1950), as amended by La. Acts
1960, No. 32, § 1. "R.S. 13:4106 declares a public policy and the provisions thereof
can not. . . be waived .... ." LA. R.S. 13:4107 (1950).
2. 323 So. 2d 221 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
3. 331 So. 2d 870 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 334 So. 2d 435 (La. 1976).
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Texas corporation. Defendant, a Louisiana corporation located in
Shreveport, apparently acted as a broker for the seller and was instrumental
in locating the purchaser of the machines. The sales agreement and a
guarantee by defendant to the seller for the purchase price were executed in
Shreveport. After delivery which was apparently effected from Arkansas to
Texas the purchaser complained of numerous defects in the machines and
returned them to the seller's assignee who sold them at private sale and
applied the proceeds to the amount owed by the purchaser. The seller had
assigned its rights under the contract to plaintiff, a Tennessee corporation,
who brought suit against the guarantor for the balance remaining on the
account.
The lower court held that the surety had been released by a failure of the
consideration for the contract between the purchaser and seller and that, in
any event, Louisiana law would preclude a deficiency judgment against the
surety since there had been no judicial appraisal of the property before its
sale. Plaintiff contended on appeal that the law of either Texas or Arkansas
was applicable and that, under the law of either state, plaintiff was entitled
to assert the deficiency against the purchaser and the guarantor.
In affirming the judgment, the Second Circuit declared that Louisiana
has a strong public policy protecting debtors against deficiency judgments
citing the Deficiency Judgment Act as an expression of that policy. It then
noted that no effective choice of law had been made by the parties and that
consequently the court must look to the interest of the various states having
contact with the transaction to determine what law should be applied.
Finding that neither Arkansas nor Texas had an interest in whether a
deficiency judgement was allowed to a Tennessee creditor against a
Louisiana debtor, the court concluded that in view of Louisiana's strong
public policy the claim against the surety should not be allowed.
The Murdock case is admittedly a close one. Had the court chosen to
rest its decision upon the fact that there were sufficient contacts with
Louisiana to make the contracts subject to its law, it would have been of
little significance. However, the basis apparently chosen by the court for its
decision was simply that Louisiana's public policy precludes a deficiency
judgment against a surety domiciled in this state even though the contract
guaranteed was to be performed in another state and the principal debtor had
not been released under the law of that state. It is doubtful that any other
state has a procedure which would satisfy the requirements of a sale with
judicial appraisal as contemplated by the Deficiency Judgment Act. To
refuse to hold a surety for his principal debtor's liability solely because the
surety is domiciled in Louisiana when the transactions are to be performed
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in another state can only serve to isolate the Louisiana business community
further from the mainstream of American commerce. The court may not
have intended its opinion to have the broad effect here suggested; nonethe-
less, a Louisiana contractor bidding on a job in another state might well
encounter difficulty with a proposal to guarantee his performance by the
bond of a Louisiana surety.
On balance, the Third Circuit's approach to the Deficiency Judgment
Act in Soileau is more satisfactory. The act does not and cannot logically
apply to sureties. A surety cannot grant to the creditor the right to sell the
principal debtor's property without appraisal, nor object to such a sale if the
creditor and principal debtor so agree. The liability of a surety is an
accessory one; his responsibility should be dependent upon whether the
actions of the creditor have effected a discharge of the primary obligation
which is guaranteed. When an action by the creditor results in the discharge
of the principal debt it should release the surety. On the other hand, if the
debtor has preserved his rights against the creditor and has not prejudiced
the surety by the release of any of his rights of subrogation, there is no
reason why the surety should not also perform his obligation. The approach
in Soileau which limits the effect of the Deficiency Judgment Act to the
debtor who waives the right of appraisal and then considers the effect which
his release has upon the liability of other parties to the transaction appears to
be the most desirable.
In Gauthier v. Scott, 4 plaintiff and defendant were the sole sharehold-
ers of a corporation which borrowed money from the American Bank and
Trust Co. The shareholders had given the bank a "continuing guaranty"
which provided that they as guarantors obligated themselves in solido for
the payment of the corporation's debt to the bank. The corporation defaulted
on its obligation. Plaintiff paid the debt and then sued the defendant for
contribution of one-half of the payment. The defendant answered relying
upon the provisions of Civil Code article 3058 which provides that a surety
who has satisfied the debt may recover from his co-sureties only if he has
paid after a law suit has been instituted.5 The plaintiff (apparently in
response to the defense) amended his petition and alleged that the petitioner
4. 327 So. 2d 702 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 330 So. 2d 314 (La. 1976).
5. "When several persons have been sureties for the same debtor and the same
debt, the surety who has satisfied the debt, has his remedy against the other sureties
in proportion to the share of each; but this remedy takes place only, when such person
has paid in consequence of a law suit instituted against him." LA. CIv. CODE art.
3058.
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and the defendant were bound in solido with the creditor. He then argued
that the provisions of article 3058 are not applicable to solidary sureties. The
court of appeal essentially agreed with the plaintiff finding that under the
provisions of Civil Code article 3045 when a surety binds himself in solido
with the debtor the relationship is regulated by the principles established for
debtors in solido not those of suretyship.6 Unfortunately for the plaintiff, it
then held that plaintiff and defendant must be considered bound solidarily
with the corporation and in the absence of proof that the corporation was
insolvent the plaintiff could recover no more than one-third of the debt from
the defendant. Civil Code article 2104 provides that when one of the debtors
in solido pays the whole debt he can claim from the others "no more than the
portion of each" unless one of them is insolvent, in which event the loss
occasioned by his insolvency must be equally shared by all of the other
co-debtors.
The court made no mention in its opinion of Civil Code article 2106
which provides that when an affair contracted in solido concerns only one of
the debtors, he is considered as a principal and the other obligors "are
considered only as his securities," thus implying that the articles on
suretyship govern the relationship between such parties. Furthermore, the
note was endorsed and delivered to the plaintiff when he paid it. The courts
have previously held that article 3058 is not applicable to a surety who pays
the principal debt and obtains a conventional subrogation of the obligation
from the creditor so that he may recover a pro rata part of the debt from the
co-surety.7 This line of cases was apparently not called to the court's
attention and it thus did not have to deal with the problem of correlating its
interpretation of article 3045 with the principles relied upon in them.
Extensive comment was made in last year's symposium8 on the difficulties
which will be occasioned in interpreting article 3045 as the court did in the
case under consideration and of the problems which are bound to arise in
attempting to apply the articles on solidarity to obligors who are in substance
sureties for a debt. To permit a surety to recover from his co-surety only
one-third of the debt which he has paid, thus leaving him to bear two-thirds
6. "The obligation of the surety towards the creditor is to pay him in case the
debtor should not himself satisfy the debt; and the property of such debtor is to be
previously discussed or seized, unless the security should have renounced the plea of
discussion, or should be bound in solido jointly with the debtor, in which case the
effects of his engagement are to be regulated by the same principles which have been
established for debtors in solido." Id. art. 3045.
7. Phillips v. Pedarre, 156 La. 509, 100 So. 699 (1924); Fox v. Corry, 149 La.
445, 89 So. 410 (1921).
8. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-
Security Devices, 36 LA. L. REV. 437 (1976).
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of the obligation which they have jointly undertaken as was done in the
present case is an example of the erroneous results to which such an
interpretation will lead.
MORTGAGES
In Quality Finance Company v. Bourque ,9 the supreme court reversed
a decision by the First Circuit and reaffirmed what the author believes has
always been the law of Louisiana. The facts were as follows: Quality
Finance Company held a second mortgage on property on which several
other persons held inferior privileges and mortgages. The owners defaulted
on their obligation to Quality which instituted executory process on its
mortgage. To avoid bankruptcy and to eliminate the cost of the executory
proceedings the owners transferred the property to Quality in consideration
of the cancellation of their debt and of the assumption by Quality of the
obligation secured by the first mortgage on the property. The total owed on
the two obligations was $29,774. The property had been appraised in the
executory proceedings at $29,000. Apparently in anticipation of the transfer
to it, Quality located a buyer who agreed to pay $29,000 for the property.
Before taking title from Quality, the prospective buyer discovered that the
inferior incumbrances had not been cancelled and refused to conclude the
sale. Quality then instituted the suit in question as a mandamus action
against the clerk to compel concellation of the incumbrances, joining the
holders of the uncancelled but inferior security as parties. The trial court
held that since the property had been appraised for less than the amount of
incumbrances cancelled or assumed by Quality no prejudice had been
suffered by the holders of the inferior security by the transfer to Quality and
ordered their security cancelled. The court of appeal affirmed the judgment
and the supreme court issued writs. The supreme court, while noting that the
appraisal of the property for $29,000 did not prove that it might not bring
more at a sheriff's sale, held that whether the inferior creditors had suffered
prejudice was immaterial. They owned real rights in the property by virtue
of their mortgages and privileges which could be extinguished only in a
manner prescribed by law and absent either a judicial sale or the consent of
the holders of the security their incumbrances remained against the
property.
THE PRIVATE WORKS AcT
In Bowles and Edens Company v. H & H Sewer Systems, Inc.,l 0 the
9. 315 So. 2d 656 (La. 1975).
10. 324 So. 2d 528 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1975).
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First Circuit Court of Appeal again wrestled with the question of whether a
surety bond given in apparent compliance with the Private Works Act is a
"statutory" or a "conventional" one. The problem is caused by the well
established rule of construction that where a "statutory" bond is given by a
surety its terms will be construed to conform to the requirement of a statute
under which it is given so that whatever is in the bond that is not required by
the statute will be read out of it and whatever is not expressed in the bond
which is required by the statute will be included in it. The problem results
from the fact that while the terms of a bond given under the Private Works
Act are prescribed by the act such a bond is "conventional" in the sense that
the owner of the property who contracts for its improvement is not obligated
to require his contractor to give a bond although his failure to do so will
subject him to liability to the laborers, suppliers of material, or subcontrac-
tors on the job. Furthermore, owners frequently require a contractor to give
a surety bond for their protection but with no evident intention of having it
conform to the act.
The court in the case under consideration concluded that a bond given
pursuant to the Private Works Act was a "statutory one" which would call
into play the rule of construction in question.
Some of the difficulty which the courts have encountered lies in the fact
that they have tended to view the rule as a matter of imperative law arising
out of the nature of the bond rather than as a judicially developed rule of
contractual construction, albeit one founded on matters of public policy.
The early cases explained the rule on the grounds that where the evident
intention of the principal was to extract from the surety a bond the terms of
which were prescribed by law any deviation from those terms would be so
contrary to the obvious intention of the parties to the contract that they
should be ignored and the bond read as though it had been properly written.
The justification for the rule thus rests upon the assumption that a surety who
is paid to give bond to comply with the requirement of law, should not be
permitted thereafter to deny that his undertaking is contrary to that which the
law required and which he is presumed to know. This has been obscured by
characterizing the rule as being dependent upon whether the bond is
"statutory" or "conventional." All bonds are conventional in that they are
the voluntary undertaking of the surety. The application of the rule should
depend not upon whether the owner was required by law to give a bond but
upon whether the surety intended to give a bond which complies with the
particular requirements of a statute. A bond given by a surety pursuant to the
Private Works Act is such a bond and if the rule has any validity at all, it
should be so applied. It is true that it may be necessary in the first instance to
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determine whether the surety did intend to undertake the responsibility
required by the statute rather than to afford the owner some lesser measure
of security. But when it is concluded that such was the case there is no less
reason to apply the rule of construction to such a bond than to any other. The
conclusion by the court of appeal is eminently correct and hopefully, the
case will help to set the matter at rest.
